Current organ procurement policies in the UK include ante-mortem interventions to facilitate organ donation. However, a clear and unambiguous legal framework for these procedures does not currently exist. The Human Tissue Act (HTA) 2004 does not provide authority for donor optimisation procedures before death, and there are a number of difficulties in encompassing these procedures within the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 provisions on best interests. This article proposes a system of specific advance consent to enable best interests to take on its ascribed role as the legal justification for donor optimisation procedures.
Introduction
The pressing need to increase the supply of organs has resulted in a range of organ procurement policies focused on meeting this need. 1 In the United Kingdom, the wellbeing of nearly 7000 patients on the active transplant list hinges on the availability of transplantable organs. In 2014-2015, 429 died while on the active waiting list and a further 807 were removed from the transplant list, mostly because of deteriorating health and many of whom would have died shortly afterwards. 2 NHS Blood and Transplant, the Special Health Authority responsible for organ donation and transplantation in the UK, employ the principle of considering donation as a normal part of end-of-life care as the "bedrock" of strategies to reduce these deaths. 2 This principle, proposed by the Organ Donation Taskforce (ODT) in 2008, 3 has provided the basis for a number of policies that encompass ante-mortem interventions to facilitate organ donation. [4] [5] [6] [7] However, this is not withstanding the recognition by the ODT, and a range of clinicians and academics, that a clear and unambiguous legal framework for these procedures does not currently exist. 3, 8, 9 The lack of legal clarity surrounding ante-mortem donor optimisation procedures is epitomised by the Clinical Guidance on organ donation published by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in 2011. 4 The Human Tissue Act (HTA) 2004 does not provide authority for ante-mortem donor optimisation procedures, leaving the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 as the only current legislation that could be applicable. NICE rely on the central principle of the MCA, the best interests of the incapacitated individual, to provide a legal defence against battery for initiating donor optimisation procedures before death. 4 To achieve their aim of improving donation rates, the guidance introduces two presumptions that do not sit comfortably with the individualistic formulation of best interests promoted by the Act. The first, that initiating donor optimisation procedures is always in the best interests of brain injured patients meeting certain clinical criteria, 8, 10 treats potential organ donors as a group rather than individuals with their own interests. The second, that an individual's wishes regarding donor optimisation procedures can be determined by reference to their registration on the NHS organ donation register (ODR) 10 fails to acknowledge that ODR registration suggests a wish to become a deceased organ donor but not necessarily to undergo invasive interventions before death.
Many of the difficulties in encompassing donor optimisation procedures within the MCA provisions on best interests stem from the lack of transparency surrounding the organ donation process and the lack of opportunity to provide specific advance consent. Potential registrants on the ODR are not informed of the timing, nature, and risks of donor optimisation procedures and are not able to register their individual wishes regarding changes to end-of-life care. 11 Knowledge of these specific wishes is essential for best interests to provide a clear and unambiguous legal framework for donor optimisation procedures. The system of specific advance consent proposed in this paper would enable best interests to take on its ascribed role as the legal justification for donor optimisation procedures.
Clinical stabilisation of the potential organ donor
The suggestion that a system of specific advance consent is needed was first made in relation to the practice of elective (or non-therapeutic) ventilation two decades ago. 12, 13 As best interests was then interpreted as being mostly limited to medical concerns, 14 this system of consent was suggested as an alternative and separate legal defence to battery. As Section 4(6) of the MCA now gives weight to the individual's wishes, a system of specific advance consent could provide a clear and inclusive legal justification within best interests. This system is proposed to provide the crucial information needed regarding individual wishes and to facilitate the inclusion of non-therapeutic ventilation and other donor optimisation procedures within the current law on best interests. Current policies, including the NICE guidance on organ donation, leave open to interpretation what procedures may be included within the "clinical stabilisation" of potential organ donors. 10 This clinical stabilisation takes place in intensive care after the identification of the patient as a potential organ donor on the basis of clinical criteria rather than on the basis of their individual wishes. NICE emphasises that no limits should be placed on either initiating or continuing life-sustaining treatments until the clinical potential to donate and the patient's wishes about organ donation have been explored, provided that this "delay" is in "the patient's overall best interests". 10 The difficulty is that the determination of whether any such "delay" is in the patient's overall best interests requires knowledge of their individual wishes, which are only assessed after the patient has received life-sustaining treatments. Undergoing life-sustaining but nontherapeutic procedures will not necessarily accord with each and every patient's wishes, and as these wishes are essential to encompassing non-therapeutic procedures within best interests, the delay in assessing wishes may result in some patients receiving treatment that is against their best interests.
The clinical stabilisation of potential organ donors is not performed with an aim of medical benefit and may cause iatrogenic harm. In this context, the procedures are intended to optimise the condition of organs for transplantation rather than improve the clinical outcome for the patient. The potential for medical harm that exists with all invasive medical interventions is a pertinent factor to the determination of the best interests of the potential organ donor. Each intervention carries a specific risk profile, and some of these risks could be significant. The capacious terminology of clinical stabilisation, the unlimited nature of the life-sustaining treatment, and the lack of guidance as to what specific interventions might be included, all generate uncertainty regarding the physical risks to the potential organ donor. It is open to interpretation whether some donor optimisation procedures, such as the delivery of intravenous medication to thin the blood, with their inherent risks, could be included under the umbrella of clinical stabilisation. 15 What is clear, however, is that to make decisions about potentially harmful procedures that are not intended to be of clinical benefit to the patient, healthcare professionals must have some way of determining the patient's view towards the physical risks.
One of the most feared risks is that of inducing a permanent vegetative state (PVS), a condition that is known to be induced by invasive medical technologies, often including mechanical ventilation, that cause the patient to survive brain injuries that would otherwise have been fatal. 13 The state in which the patient survives is one of continuing wakefulness without evidence of awareness: their vegetative functions are intact yet they are -or appear to be -entirely incognizant. 16 Since PVS was first highlighted as a potential risk of non-therapeutic ventilation, research has demonstrated that many patients who are initially diagnosed with PVS are subsequently found to be in a minimally conscious state (MCS). 17 The aetiology behind both conditions appears to be the same, 17 suggesting the possibility for some patients to survive non-therapeutic ventilation in a severely disabled state whilst retaining or re-developing a degree of awareness. Some of these patients may be capable of experiencing both physical pain and psychological distress. 18 In comparison to the risk of developing either condition, many individuals are likely to consider a more immediate death to be a relative benefit.
It is difficult to account for donor optimisation procedures that carry a risk of serious physical harm within the best interests of any individual. It may still be possible to include procedures such as non-therapeutic ventilation within an individual's best interests if it is known that the individual did not consider the risks to be unacceptable. However, this relies on the individual having been informed of the risks and on their views towards these risks being known. It is only with this information that decision-makers can proceed to weigh up the individual's views and wishes against the risk of physical harm.
Centrality of the individual to best interests
Although the law does not seek to limit the considerations that contribute to ascertaining a patient's best interests, the statutory best interests checklist is predominantly concerned with what the individual themselves would have decided. Section 4(6) of the MCA 2005 requires healthcare professionals to consider, "so far as is reasonably ascertainable" (a) the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity), (b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, and (c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.
This checklist focuses the consideration of healthcare professionals on the incapacitated patient as an individual, placing potential organ donors at the centre of decisions regarding their own end of life care. This central position afforded to the individual both allows altruistic wishes to undergo donor optimisation procedures to be encompassed within the best interests assessment and precludes any such wishes from being presumed. However, there may be problems in achieving this central position for potential organ donors. Empirical research by Kitzinger and Kitzinger suggests that medical interventions on patients with severe brain injury are often initiated without any consultation with relatives to ascertain whether or not the individual would have wanted them. 19 The apparent failure of some doctors to consider the individual's viewpoint before initiating medical interventions suggests a lack of understanding of the MCA provisions and a reluctance to move away from the traditional paternalistic medical model of decision-making. 20, 21 For non-therapeutic interventions, such as donor optimisation procedures, any lack of consideration of the individual's viewpoint before the initiation of treatment is not supported by the provisions of the MCA and cannot be justified on the grounds of any medical benefit to the patient. It is only by embracing the empowering ethos of the Act and acknowledging the centrality of the individual that healthcare professionals will be protected from liability for initiating procedures of no medical benefit to the potential organ donor.
The centrality of the individual to best interests has been confirmed by the first case under the MCA 2005 to come before the Supreme Court. In Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James, Lady Hale recognises that all of the limited guidance provided by the MCA on determining whether a particular treatment is in an individual's best interests is focused on "the need to see the patient as an individual, with his own values, likes and dislikes, and to consider his best interests in a holistic way". 22 Lady Hale expands on the statutory guidance as follows:
[I]n considering the best interests of this particular patient at this particular time, decision-makers must look at his welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but social and psychological; they must consider the nature of the medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of success; they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude to the treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must consult others who are looking after him or interested in his welfare, in particular for their view of what his attitude would be. 23 The purpose of the best interests test is stated by Lady Hale to be "to consider matters from the patient's point of view". 24 Although Lady Hale clarifies that the patient's wishes might not necessarily prevail, she emphasises that insofar as they are ascertainable, it is the patient's wishes, feelings, beliefs, values "or things which were important to him" which should be taken into account as they are a component in making a decision which is "right for him as an individual human being". 24 This affords the individual a leading role in the determination of their own best interests and demands that healthcare professionals do not substitute their own viewpoint for that of the patient. If it can be established what the individual would want in the individual circumstances, then it should be established.
There are three separate factors determining an individual's attitude to donor optimisation procedures: their wishes regarding deceased organ donation; their wishes regarding their own end-of-life care; and their views on the potential risks of the procedures. The first factor, the patient's wishes regarding organ donation, is the only one of the three that is specified in the NICE guidance on determining best interests. This is particularly determined by reference to any advance statement or registration on the Organ Donor Register (ODR) and also by any expression of views to family or friends. 25 However, not all individuals who have expressed a wish to become a deceased organ donor, including those registered on the ODR, might wish to undergo changes to their end of life care and not all would be willing to accept a risk of physical harm. The current system provides no way of ascertaining the individual's attitude towards ante-mortem interventions to facilitate organ donation rather than their attitude towards deceased organ donation.
The individual's wishes regarding their end-of-life care may impact significantly on their attitude to donor optimisation procedures. Individual wishes towards end-of-life care may be influenced by a wide range of considerations, many of which could potentially outweigh individual wishes regarding deceased organ donation. The individual may place more importance on their wishes and views towards intensive and/or palliative care, views on what constitutes a good death, fears regarding medical technology, religious beliefs, and ethical commitments other than becoming a deceased organ donor. The balance of these considerations is unique to each individual and should not be presumed on the basis of their views towards deceased organ donation alone.
The individual's views towards the potential risks of donor optimisation procedures may contribute towards their wishes regarding their end-of-life care but can also be distinguished as a factor requiring specific consideration within best interests. The individual's attitude to donor optimisation procedures is influenced by the level of physical risk that they would be prepared to accept to become an organ donor. Even individuals whose wishes regarding their end-of-life care are consistent with undergoing donor optimisation procedures have differing benefit-risk preferences. Some may consider any risk of physical harm to outweigh the benefit they might accrue from undergoing donor optimisation procedures. Others might place such importance on becoming an organ donor as to be willing to risk even the most significant risks of serious physical harm at the end of life. These differing benefit-risk preferences may be the determining factor in the overall attitude of potential organ donors towards donor optimisation procedures.
The formulation of best interests incorporated into the MCA 2005 reflects the principle of precedence of individual interests, which states that the interests of the individual should always prevail over societal and/ or scientific interests. 26 No matter how great the needs of others in society, donor optimisation procedures can only be carried out if they can be demonstrated to be in the individual interests of the potential organ donor. These interests may include a social interest in the well-being of potential organ recipients and psychological interests in becoming an organ donor. The potential for exploitation that accompanies such interests demands that there is evidence of a genuine wish to undergo ante-mortem interventions to facilitate organ donation and that this evidence is weighed up against the potential for harm.
Individual interests are not confined to self-regarding interests, even in circumstances in which the patient is unaware or displays no reaction to their otherregarding interests being met. 27, 28 The actual altruistic wishes of an individual identified as a potential organ donor are highly relevant to their best interests. Although putative wishes are sometimes recognised as part of best interests, 27 relying on speculative or hypothetical wishes as the sole benefit to the potential organ donor appears closer to a substituted judgement than a decision that is genuinely in their best interests. Ascertaining the individual's actual wishes in the circumstances enables a decision that correlates with where that individual believes or believed their own interests to lie.
Altruistic concern for others is a factor in which an individual may have a social interest, and this social interest may be intertwined with psychological benefit for the potential organ donor. 29 However, at the time of the procedures the potential organ donor may not necessarily be able to experience any psychological benefit. Involving potential ODR registrants in the decision-making process regarding donor optimisation procedures may allow them to experience some psychological benefit in advance of the procedures. Moreover, to encompass psychological benefit within the law on best interests, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the incapacitated individual is able to experience psychological benefit. Even in patients who are thought to be unaware, non-experiential benefits are afforded a position of importance within medical law. Psychological benefit to the potential organ donor does not need to be tangible in the sense that it is experiential, 30 but may nevertheless be tangible in the sense that it is discernible by reference to the individual's previously expressed wishes.
Incapacitated patients identified as potential organ donors might be assumed not to be able to experience psychological benefit or harm from donor optimisation procedures. However, this assumption may not necessarily be correct in all cases. The clinical identification of potential organ donors relies on the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), yet each of the three components of the GCS score may be affected by conditions other than a lack of awareness. 31 A range of factors affecting patients meeting the clinical criteria for entry into the organ donation pathway, including damage to the language and motor systems in the brain, may have as their consequence an inability to express awareness rather than an absence of awareness. 32 A proportion of these patients may have enough awareness as to be able to experience psychological benefit or harm from donor optimisation procedures. This potential for retaining experiential interests makes it imperative for decision-makers to have knowledge of the individual's wishes in the circumstances in order to determine where any remaining psychological interests lie.
The balance of best interests
Although the MCA affords individual wishes a central position within the best interests' assessment, there is no statutory guidance on how to balance these wishes against the potential for physical harm. The balance sheet is a common law approach which requires decision-makers to demonstrate that the benefits to the patient outweigh the harms. 33 This approach has received continued judicial approval following the enactment of the MCA, 34 yet the weight to be afforded to the diverse considerations that contribute to the best interests assessment is not always clear. 35 The MCA Code of Practice states that flexibility is required to enable the prioritisation of factors in different cases, while acknowledging that this flexibility could create problems in reaching a conclusion as to where an individual's best interests lie. 36 This potential for inconclusiveness appears at variance with the requirement to demonstrate that the benefits to the patient outweigh the harms. The results of the best interests assessment are presented as an objective decision, yet the prioritisation of one or more factors over others requires a balancing exercise between considerations that are not always readily comparable.
The case-law provides only a limited amount of guidance to assist decision-makers in determining which factor or factors should be prioritised over others in a particular case. In Re M (Statutory Will), the guidance given suggests that -in some circumstances -a factor may be so crucial to the determination of best interests as to constitute a decisive factor. 37 Mr Justice Munby acknowledges that the MCA "lays down no hierarchy" between the different factors to be taken into account. 37 This allows decisionmakers to attach differing weights to the different factors depending on the individual circumstances of each case. Mr Justice Munby recognises that there may be a particular case in which one or more factors are of "magnetic importance" in influencing or determining the outcome. 37 He clarifies that the individual's wishes and feelings may, in some particular cases, provide that magnetic factor and carry "preponderant weight". 37 His analysis implies that the law on best interests could accommodate an approach that affords preponderant weight to the individual wishes of the potential organ donor. However, whether it would accommodate such an approach may vary depending on the individual circumstances of each potential organ donor.
The judiciary does not always afford significant weight to previously expressed wishes, and this is of particular concern in relation to the statutory protection afforded to wishes that the patient has not recorded in writing. Other expressions of wishes, "through verbal communication . . ., behaviour or habits, or recorded in any other way", 38 are included within section 4(6), yet they are not always afforded any weight let alone preponderant weight. Judgements such as that made in Re M (Adult Patient)(Minimally Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment), in which the "decisive factor" was found to be the preservation of life rather than M's past verbal statements of wishes, 39 appear at odds with the requirement of section 4 (6) . In this case, Mr Justice Baker discounted clear evidence of M's wishes because of a reluctant to sanction withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a patient who may have been capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. 40 Those wishes could not have been so easily discounted had they met the validity and applicability requirements of the MCA provisions on advance decisions, which in relation to life-sustaining treatments include the condition that they must be in writing. 41 A written record that does not fulfil all of the MCA conditions on advance decisions, such as an advance consent to treatment, is also less easily discounted as a factor in the determination of best interests. It is afforded particular consideration under section 4(6) (a) and is less easy to deprioritise in relation to other factors.
In the particular circumstances of donor optimisation procedures, the only benefit to the potential organ donor is acting in accordance with their individual wishes and feelings. As the only benefit bringing donor optimisation procedures within the scope of best interests, those individual wishes and feelings acquire magnetic importance. Nevertheless, that does not necessarily mean that they should be afforded preponderant weight as they could still potentially be outweighed by the physical risks to the potential organ donor. The physical risks of the most invasive procedures, such as the risk of PVS from mechanical ventilation, may rival the individual's wishes for position as the decisive factor. Healthcare professionals have an ethical commitment not only to respect the wishes of each potential organ donor but also to protect them from harm. However, the legal standard of best interests does not incorporate primum non nocere as a principle to be upheld above all others. Respecting individual wishes has increasingly taken over from "do no harm" as the most crucial contributing factor to medical decision-making. The shift from the paternalistic medical model to a model based on individual autonomy suggests that the risk of physical harm would have to be highly significant to take on the role of the decisive factor. If a potential organ donor has accepted the risks of physical harm that accompany invasive donor optimisation procedures, there would need to be compelling reasons to override an expressed wish to undergo such procedures.
A system for determining best interests
For best interests to provide a clear legal justification for donor optimisation procedures, decision-makers need evidence of the individual's specific wishes in the circumstances. The highest level of evidence would be provided by an advance written statement, which is afforded particular consideration under section 4(6) of the MCA. The Code of Practice advises that this consideration should be equal to that afforded to a contemporary written statement. 42 Decision-makers who do not follow a relevant written statement are advised to record their reasons and need to be able to justify these reasons. 42 For advance written consent for donor optimisation procedures, these reasons might include the risk of physical harm. However, healthcare professionals need to be able to justify any decision not to follow an advance written consent on the grounds that it is not in the individual's best interests rather than substituting their own risk-benefit preferences for that of the patient. For advance written refusals that fulfil the MCA provisions on validity and applicability, the law requires decision-makers to follow the advance decision. 36 This is a higher standard of protection to individual autonomy than the law requires in relation to either advance written consent or to advance refusals that do not fulfil the validity and applicability requirements.
Verbal expressions of wishes may also potentially allow donor optimisation procedures to be encompassed within best interests. However, this not only relies on the individual having considered the relevant issues whilst competent but also on the individual communicating their wishes to relatives or other people with an interest in their welfare. Furthermore, it relies on those people being available and able to accurately relate those wishes to the healthcare professionals determining best interests. The case of Re M (Adult Patient)(Minimally Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment), 34 as discussed above, demonstrates the ease with which decision-makers can override informally expressed wishes in favour of values that the individual may not have themselves held. With respect to potential organ donors, verbal wishes may still contribute towards the assessment of their best interests and may sometimes provide enough evidence to encompass donor optimisation procedures within the law. However, the problems in determining what the patient would actually have wanted in the circumstances are best avoided by the provision of an opportunity to register an advance written decision regarding donor optimisation procedures.
For best interests to provide a clear legal justification for donor optimisation procedures, decisionmakers must be able to ascertain not only the individual's wishes regarding organ donation, but crucially also their wishes regarding their end-of-life care and their viewpoint towards the physical risks of the procedures. To meet these crucial elements of best interests, potential ODR registrants should be provided with information regarding the timing, nature and risks of donor optimisation procedures and afforded the opportunity to register advance consent, refusal, or a combination of both. Transparency regarding the organ donation process would remove the need to rely on a presumption that an individual's wishes regarding deceased organ donation equate to their wishes regarding ante-mortem interventions to facilitate organ donation. A record of the patient's actual wishes in the circumstances would remove the speculative aspect of ascertaining best interests and enable decisions which accord with the individual's viewpoint towards procedures before death rather than procedures after death.
Current policy and practice do not facilitate the timely provision of information essential to the best interests determination. Rapidity of access should be achievable with modern information technology, negating the need to initiate donor optimisation procedures prior to the exploration of individual wishes. The initiation or non-initiation of treatment based on individual wishes rather than solely on clinical criteria is essential to securing the legality of donor optimisation procedures. This is important to protect, respect, and promote the autonomy, bodily integrity, and dignity of each individual identified as a potential organ donor. A system that recognises the importance of these legal and ethical considerations is best placed to maintain the integrity and functioning of the organ donation programme.
